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The idea of common corporate income tax (CIT) in EU gains even more attendance. Howev-
er, there are several features of particular EU countries, which make the benefits of EU-wide 
harmonization dubious and its effects could be uneqally distributed. Among these features 
are inter alia: (i) requirement for capital, (ii) size of the economies, (iii) differences in labor 
taxation, (iv) set of public goods available to taxp yers, (v) agglomeration externalities, (vi) 
richness of societies and (vii) tax culture including tax morale. The differences within the EU 
are particularly visible taking into consideration two groups of countries i.e. the Old EU and 
New Member States. Based on some approximation of the economies of EU-15 and EU-12 
countries, the article shows the obstacles for future CIT harmonization. 
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1. Introduction 
The EU seeks to foster its internal market. This process involves also taxation. 
Therefore, it indents to harmonize taxes among the Member States. Following that 
path several indirect taxes (i.e. Value Added Tax, customs duty and excise duty) has 
been already unified to a great extend. Currently, the European Commission focuses 
on unification of direct taxes and particularly on CIT.  
In view of the above, the European Commission proposed to introduce in the 
EU a unified method of calculation of the tax base (i.e. so called Common Consoli-
dated Corporate Tax Base or CCCTB). According to the project, multinational cor-
porations will be free to choose between CCCTB and existing national taxation 
rules. The decision on the tax rates under CCCTB should be left to the discretion of 
Member States. However, in the future a natural step forward should be both elimi-
nation of national regulations and harmonization of the tax rates to achieve full uni-
fication of CIT. Especially countries with elevated tax rates may be the strong advo-
cates of such developments, in the hope that this will diminish their competitive dis-
advantage against Member States with low tax rates. 
It is of course a future and uncertain matter and therefore cannot be subject to 
scientific verification. However, a question arises whether the whole EU, taking into 
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consideration current features of Member States, is economically able to accommo-
date a fully common CIT. Unfortunately, the EU seems not to be an optimal single 
fiscal area. This is because particular countries differ vastly. In this article I will 
show these varieties only based on general and approximated features two groups of 
countries represent – namely New Member States1 and the Old EU countries.2 In the 
following sections I discuss the differences, which are particularly relevant for CIT 
purposes for these regions. 
2. Requirement for capital 
Globalization of the world economy reveals in increas d abilities of the international 
firms to shift taxable profits between countries and easiness of abroad investments. 
This has led to tax competition between the states. Not surprisingly Member States 
also take part in the so called “race to the bottom”.  
The most vivid feature of any tax system are taxation rates and therefore, they 
are often used in tax competition. Countries are encouraged to lower the CIT rates 
because they perceive them as an important factor, which either lures or deters for-
eign investments. Such reasoning is especially vivid, when the process is analyzed 
from the perspective of two groups of countries i.e. th  New Member States and the 
EU-15. The Old EU on average significantly cut their CIT rates. The New Member 
States have responded to the CIT competition pressu and decreased their corporate 
income tax rates even more. This forced again the EU-15 to further tax rate reduc-
tions. The trend of disparity of average CIT rates in the Old EU and New Member 
States is depicted on the below graph. 
Based on the below Figure it seems that New Member States were more “in 
need” of capital than the Old EU, where the capital w s already installed. After the 
fall of communism and in the years of transformation capital in Central Europe was 
scarce, which was unlike the Western countries. Even now the disparity is signifi-
cant. Whereas according to the Eurostat data for 2012 the stock of foreign direct in-
vestments (“FDI”) in EU-15 was EUR 6.1 trillion, this Figure for the New Member 
States was just EUR 0.5 trillion – a value much lower taking even into consideration 
the population of respective areas.  
Taxation of foreign capital is always tempting. For example Huizinga and 
Nicodème estimated that a one percentage point increase in foreign ownership of the 
                                                   
 
1 12 countries, which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Croatia, which accessed EU in 2013 is not 
included in the analysis). 
2 15 countries, which formed EU before 2004. 
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companies increases the average CIT rate between a half and one percent 
(Huizinga–Nicodeme 2003). Therefore, the New Member States should constantly 
put more pressure on CIT competition than the Old EU and as a result full EU-wide 
CIT harmonization may not be beneficial for them. 
Figure 1. Difference between average top CIT rates 
 
Source: Own construction based on data from Taxation trends i  the European Union (2013) 
3. Size of economies 
The appropriateness of lower CIT burden levied on cmpanies in the New Member 
States can be explained also by the differences in ize of those countries. New 
Member States are on average smaller, if not always in terms of population, then at 
least measured by the size of the economy. Such comparison is presented below. 
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Source: Own construction based on data from Eurostat 
 
As for 2013 among the twelve smallest economies of the EU, eleven were 
New Member States. The only exception was Poland with the economy of the size 
just in the middle of the stake of remaining 15 countries.  
It may be stated that in fact independent tax jurisdictions share a mobile CIT 
base by competing for scarce capital. Classic economic models claim that assuming 
perfect capital mobility the optimal CIT rate for a small open economy equals to ze-
ro (Diamond–Mirrlees 1971, Zodrow–Mieszkowski 1986, Wilson 1986)). Small 
economies are proportionally more affected by the seady increase in capital mobili-
ty than the large countries. This is due to the fact, that outflow of certain amount of 
capital from a small economy could trigger more sever  consequences for such state 
than the loss of the same amount of capital for a large country.  
Gordon and Varian conclude that bigger countries may h ve some market 
power in the world capital market, which supports taxation of capital (Gordon–
Varian 1989). Large jurisdictions, which have some onopsony power, are able to 
“export” part of its tax burden to non-residents in the form of their reduced after-tax 
returns to capital (Zodrow–Mieszkowski 1983). Thus, quite an intuitive conclusion 
would be that small countries, like New Member States, could improve national wel-
fare by cutting CIT rates more than the big countries as the response from capital 
owners would be there higher. It seems, that at present those states follow this con-
clusion in reality. 
Bucovetsky and Wilson show that a small country should tax only labor, 
which supply elasticity, unlike in case of capital supply, is finite (Bucovetsky–
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Wilson 1991). Large regions on the other hand, which can influence the equilibrium 
of after-tax returns on capital, can tax capital on a source-basis.  
Summarizing, small economies should keep the CIT burden on the low level. 
Therefore, countries belonging to the Old EU can tax corporations more heavily 
than smaller New Member States, which now happens in practice. Consequently, 
disparity in size of the economies is the following ar ument against full harmoniza-
tion of CIT. 
4. Labor taxation 
A company, which as a rule is subject to CIT, is not the final income taxpayer. A 
company is always owned by individual or a group of individuals. Therefore, indi-
vidual shareholders are always subject to double taxation both at the level of a com-
pany (with CIT) and at their own level (with PIT). It is worth considering the actual 
income tax burden of the individuals. 
This relation partially explains Miller in his model (Miller 1977). The after-
tax return from equity income is , where CIT is the corpo-
rate income tax rate and  is the personal income tax rate imposed on dividends. 
If instead of dividends the investor derives income from debt, the net income would 
be ( , where  is the progressive PIT rate. Thus, as long as the fol-
lowing inequation is met  the investor 
should prefer to hold shares in a company rather than gain an interest income. Con-
sequently, from this perspective the investor who takes a decision whether to buy 
shares or gain income from non-corporate sources should compare (i) the after-tax 
returns on investments in corporate sector (subject to CIT and subsequently PIT on 
dividend distribution) with (ii) the after-tax returns in non-corporate sector, which 
would be subject to progressive PIT tax rates but no CIT would be charged at any 
stage.  
From purely tax point of view investments in non-corporate sector could be 
more profitable for the majority of population because most people are subject to 
low PIT rates as they are in low taxation brackets. However, a relatively small per-
centage of individuals with the highest income hold a significant number of shares 
in companies. Hence, as they are subject to high progressive PIT rates, they may 
prefer to derive income from corporate sources. The reasoning is shown on the be-
low Figure. 
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Figure 3. Debt vs. equity investing under different income and PIT brackets 
















Source: Own construction based on Miller (1977) 
 
Thus, more affluent people, who are subject to higher PIT rate brackets 
should prefer equity income, which is not taxed with progressive PIT rates (depicted 
by gridded field). However, those who earn less and re subject to lower progressive 
PIT rates should be better off if they do not invest in equity (depicted by the stripped 
field) but in debt instruments. Assuming that among EU-15 countries there are more 
affluent people, this partially explains the capacity of those countries to maintain 
higher CIT rates, which on the other hand may turn out to be too high for the New 
Member States (if full tax harmonization is executed) and significantly decrease the 
profitability of local companies. 
The following reason supporting maintenance of the CIT wedge between the 
New Member States and the EU-15 is also disparity in he level of PIT rates. Name-
ly, CIT is often seen as a part of progressive tax system and a backstop for PIT. The 
reason is that some taxpayers could choose whether to pay PIT or CIT, depending 
on what taxation system they perceive as more favorable to them. In the absence of 
CIT or with more favorable regulations of CIT than PIT those taxpayers, which pay 
PIT would feel incentive to incorporate to avoid income taxation. Consequently, the 
PIT revenues would erode and the income taxation practically would cease to exist. 
Thus, as evidence shows, the CIT rates are usually higher in countries, which im-
pose high top PIT rates. Slemrod found in his cross c untry analysis a strong associ-
ation between the top statutory CIT rate and the top statutory PIT rates (Slemrod 
Return to holding 
equity (1-CIT)(1-PITd) 
 
Return to holding debt 
(1-CIT)(1-PITp) T
I
EU-15 countries, New Member States and Harmonization of Corporate Income Tax 
 
107 
2004). Therefore, unification of CIT should be accompanied by harmonization of 
PIT. Otherwise too high CIT burden in low CIT countries (mostly New Member 
States), would erode there the taxation base, becaus  entities would feel incentive to 
change their legal form in order to become PIT payers (which still could be lower). 
On the below graph is presented the development of the average top PIT rates for 
the EU-15 and the New Member Countries. 
Figure 4. Average top PIT rates in EU-15 countries and New Memb r States 
 
Source: Own construction based on data from Taxation Trends i  the European Union 2013 
 
Taking into consideration the above on average top PIT rates in the EU-15 are 
higher than among New Member States. Therefore, having in mind that PIT func-
tions as a CIT backstop this is a following argument against unification of CIT 
across the whole EU. 
5. Public goods 
A tax in general is an enforced contribution without direct counter service. Natural-
ly, so is also CIT. Therefore, any taxpayer should be interested in paying least pos-
sible taxes. Public goods are accessible to all free of charge. Hence, if taxes weren’t 
obligatory, the free rider problem would arise i.e.taxpayers would feel no incentive 
to pay (indirectly) for public goods, as public goods are available for the whole soci-
ety, also for those, who do not pay public contributions.  
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The Tiebout model assumes that different regions offer certain basket of 
goods at various prices (Tiebout 1956). Those goods are public goods and their 
availability corresponds to the taxation burden imposed by each tax jurisdiction. 
Given that (i) taxpayers have different preferences with respect to the scope of gov-
ernment services they require and (ii) the price they are ready to pay in form of taxes 
varies, they move between different tax jurisdictions. In course of the choice process 
of the taxpayers and through appropriate reactions t  that choices of particular re-
gions, economic agents and tax jurisdictions determine the equilibria in a number of 
countries where the taxpayers maximize their utility functions by moving to the tax 
jurisdiction, which they found most suitable. The model proposed by Tibeout was 
designed originally for individuals. Fischel, White and more recently Wellisch sug-
gested, however, that the theory can be also easily dopted for multinational firms, 
which can change their residence according to their pr ferences depending on the 
mix of public goods and taxes (Fischel 1975, White 1975, Wellisch 2000). 
Consequently, particular countries provide for different set of public goods. 
Therefore, although generally investors may be inclined to pay lower taxes, concur-
rently they are interested in usage of public goods, which are financed by those taxes 
and accessible only on the territory of that particular state. As a result, higher CIT is 
justified in the EU-15. Concurrently, if CIT was on the same level among the New 
Member States, the investors could resign from locating capital there. 
6. Agglomeration externalities  
The economic geography literature claims that companies focus on the size of host 
domestic market and take into consideration its density i.e. concentration of the de-
mand around specific centers (Brakman et al. 2001). The key is thus the market po-
tential connected with a particular location. Hence, th  preferable choice are usually 
agglomerations, where investors could save on logistics and take advantage from 
agglomeration externalities. Those benefits include int r alia access to new technol-
ogies, well educated labor force, financial, social and political stability. To the ex-
tend this factors are financed from taxes, high taxes should not discourage invest-
ments but even attract FDI (Campbell 2005). 
In high tax locations residents demand high level of public services and sup-
port elevated CIT as a financing source. Governments can impose high CIT in ag-
glomerations, which would not trigger outflow of capit l as the tax would be im-
posed largely on location-specific rents. Baldwin and Krugman claim that this holds 
for European area appointed by the triangle between London, Hamburg and Milan 
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(Baldwin–Krugman 2004). This means, that CIT should not discourage capital in 
these locations to flee.  
Thus, governments – like those of Old EU – compensat  investors for higher 
CIT (Slemrod 2004, Devereux et al. 2008). As investors perceive CIT as price for 
availability of agglomeration externalities, they will accept high income taxation. 
This is also the reason why they expect New Member States to keep CIT on the 
lower level. Unification of CIT may harm these states also from this perspective. 
7. Richness of the societies 
There are five commonly accepted features a good taxation system should meet. 
One of them is justice, which means that a good tax system should provide for just 
treatment of various economic agents. However, according to this idea justice is not 
exactly what it may seem. There is a concept of so called vertical justice, which 
states that parties capable of paying higher taxes should simply pay them.  
Taking into consideration the above, imposing on entrepreneurs in different 
locations the same amount of CIT is not appropriate. Namely, EU-15 countries levy 
on average higher CIT burden than New Member States, because taxpayers in those 
countries are typically more affluent and therefore capable of paying proportionally 
more taxes (according to vertical justice concept).  
Moreover, people who earn more, save also more (Żyżyński 2009). Therefore, 
without major loss in their well-being they could bear more CIT (assuming that the 
economic cost of any tax – including CIT – is eventually born by individuals and not 
by companies, which was broadly discussed in the lierature). 
It should be underlined that CIT bear not the companies but their ultimate 
owner, which are individuals. The richness of residnts of various EU countries is 
presented below. 
Taking into consideration the above thirteen countries, where the GDP per in-
habitant is highest belong to EU-15. The only exceptions are Greece and Portugal. 
However, still those states are in the middle of the stake. Importantly, the above 
Figure compares only the current incomes. However, if the total possessions were 
taken into consideration the discrepancy between an average EU-15 and New Mem-
ber State resident would be even greater. 
Consequently, the same tax for the whole EU would not be just according to 
the concept of good taxation system. The cost of tax should correspond to a particu-
lar economy of each Member State. 
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Source: Own construction based on data from Eurostat 
8. Tax morale 
Several researchers claim that most standard economic models fail to grasp the tax 
compliance of the taxpayers properly. In particular tax compliance cannot be ex-
plained solely by deterrence, risk aversion, tax burden or density of tax regulations. 
For example Alm et al. as well as Frey and Feld argue that most economic models 
assume too much tax evasion (Alm et al. 1992, Frey–F ld 2002). In fact several tax-
payers do not even seek ways to evade taxes and canot be seen as simple utility 
maximizers, although in certain situations omitting taxes could be more favorable to 
them. 
Frey underlines that tax morality differs across countries (Frey 1997). He 
points inter alia social norms and societal institutions, which are important determi-
nants of tax morality and vary between states. Therefore, assuming that tax morale is 
higher among Old EU, these countries are able to impose higher CIT burden with 
lower risk of tax evasion.  
Torgler and Schneider found strong negative correlation between shadow 
economy (Torgler–Schneider 2007) and tax morale. According to their study the 
lower is tax morale, the more likely is that the shadow economy will be bigger. They 
claim that if taxpayers perceive government as helpful rather than wasteful, they 
tend to comply with own tax obligations and stay in the official sector. Shadow 
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economy differs in the EU and tends to be greater among New Member States. As-
suming that the level of tax morale follows the size of shadow economy, this also 
supports the claim that CIT burden in the New Member Countries should be lower 
than among Old EU. 
Abed and Gupta claimed that among former soviet state  institutional weak-
nesses and corruption was one of the major obstacle to market reforms (Abed–
Gupta 2002). If economic agents feel that they are cheated, the corruption is wide-
spread and that they are not well protected by law,they are more inclined to be ac-
tive in the informal sector and evade taxes. Hence, this also supports our hypothesis. 
Religion also supports tax morale as it acts as a “supernatural police” (Ander-
son–Tollison 1992). Alm and Torgler found that higher church attendance leads to 
greater tax morality (Alm–Torgler 2006). Again, most post-communistic New 
Member States do not feature high religiosity.  
Anyway, customs are very difficult to change. Taxes have a long tradition in 
the Old EU and local citizens appreciate it. In general state tax administration seems 
there also to be more responsive and less corrupted. Economic agents probably 
evade there taxes less than in Central Europe partially because they have higher tax 
morale. All these features, which however are difficult to measure, suggest that 
equalization of the corporate tax within the whole EU could be counterproductive. 
Even if the CIT burden is set on some medium level both the Old EU and New 
Member States might lose tax revenues but for different reasons – i.e. Western Eu-
rope because reduction of taxation and Central Europe because of increase of cor-
ruption and shadow economy in general. 
9. Conclusion 
Harmonization of CIT in the EU is recently on the agenda. It should contribute to a 
common market and ease the life for the multinationl companies. However, poten-
tial harmonization of CIT will include also several consequences, which are far 
more reaching than taxation only. Economies of Membr States differ significantly 
and may not be ready for a common taxation. In this article I tried to highlight sev-
eral arguments, which support this hypothesis. Among them are inter alia such is-
sues as: (i) requirement for capital, (ii) size of the economies, (iii) differences in la-
bor taxation, (iv) set of public goods available to taxpayers, (v) agglomeration exter-
nalities, (vi) richness of societies or (vii) level of tax morale. 
Introduction of CCCTB indeed could be appropriate solution for the whole 
EU. Surprisingly, it may even foster the tax competition, because comparison of 
corporate income taxation burden will be easier with a unified tax base. However, 
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taking into consideration different features of theeconomies of particular Member 
States, it seems that EU is not homogenous enough to adopt full CIT harmonization 
(i.e. including tax rate). 
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